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 From Smith to Smickle: 
The Charter’s Minimal Impact on 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
Debra Parkes* 
I. MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES IN CANADA:  
GROWTH AND POPULAR APPEAL 
On March 13, 2012, Bill C-10, the Safe Streets and Communities 
Act,1 received Royal Assent. Among other significant changes to criminal 
and penal law,2 the Bill added new mandatory minimum sentences, 
including a number to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.3 With 
these amendments, the number of mandatory minimum sentences 
approaches 100.4 In 1987, when the Supreme Court of Canada decided R. 
v. Smith,5 the foundational case interpreting section 12 of the Canadian 
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1 Bill C-10, An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to amend the State 
Immunity Act, the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act and other Acts, S.C. 2012, c. 1. 
2 Bill C-10 was dubbed the Omnibus Crime Bill because it combined nine bills that had 
been dealt with separately during the previous parliamentary session, making substantial and wide-
ranging changes to a number of statutes. Changes include adding further restrictions on the 
availability of conditional sentences, making “protection of society” the fundamental principle of the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, reducing the availability of pardons, and replacing as a 
guiding principle for corrections a commitment to “us[ing] the least restrictive measures consistent 
with the protection of the public, staff members and offenders” with a new principle that the 
measures “are limited to only what is necessary and proportionate to attain the purposes of this Act”. 
3 S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
4 By my count there are now 84 mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and 14 in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, id. (counting a hybrid 
offence as one even where there is a minimum sentence for both indictable and summary options; 
and counting a first offence minimum as one and a subsequent offence minimum as another). There 
are other ways to count that would yield a higher or lower number, but the key point is that we have 
witnessed a rapid proliferation of mandatory sentences, beginning in 1996 and escalating from 2006-
present. 
5 [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”]. 
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms,6 the right to be free from “cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment”, there were just nine mandatory 
minimum sentences on the books.7 Coinciding with the passage of Bill 
C-10 through Parliament, and some high-profile opposition to the Bill,8 a 
justice of the Ontario Superior Court released her decision in R. v. 
Smickle,9 declaring the three-year minimum penalty for possession of a 
loaded firearm invalid as constituting cruel and unusual punishment 
contrary to section 12 of the Charter. The decision has been heralded as a 
harbinger of future Charter challenges to provisions of Bill C-10.10 For 
example, David Daubney, former General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy 
and Coordinator of Sentencing Reform at Justice Canada, said in his blog 
upon the passage of Bill C-10: 
The proliferation of mandatory minimum sentencing will lead to fewer 
guilty pleas, significant processing delays, big increases in the number 
of accused persons awaiting trial in already overcrowded provincial 
remand facilities and just plain injustice as discretion is moved from 
judges to prosecutors. There will be many more Charter challenges and 
acquittals. Canadians will be less safe.11 
Much could be (and has been) said about the extent to which manda-
tory minimum sentences are bad policy.12 Their proliferation has been 
                                                                                                             
6 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
7 Julian V. Roberts, Nicole Crutcher & Paul Verbrugge, “Public Attitudes to Sentencing in 
Canada: Exploring Recent Findings” (2007) 49:1 Can. J. Crimin. & Crim. Jus. 75, at 81 [hereinafter 
“Roberts, Crutcher & Verbrugge”]. 
8 For example, an online campaign by a youth-oriented organization, Lead Now, organized 
rallies, demonstrations at MP’s offices, and an e-mail campaign that resulted in over 30,000 
Canadians sending messages urging Senators to vote against Bill C-10. See Lead Now, Tell the 
Senate: Don’t rubber stamp the Crime Bill, online: Lead Now <http://leadnow.ca/keep-canada-safe> 
[hereinafter “Lead Now”]. A number of provincial governments, led by Quebec, expressed 
opposition to the Bill and the financial strain it would put on provincial budgets. See The Canadian 
Press, Provincial pleas for federal crime bill funding dismissed, online: CBCNews 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/story/2012/01/26/pei-crime-bill-justice-minister-
meeting-584.html> [hereinafter “The Canadian Press”]. 
9 [2012] O.J. No. 612, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Smickle”]. 
10 Liberal MP Irwin Cotler has suggested that Bill C-10 will face numerous Charter chal-
lenges. Cotler asked the Minister of Justice, Rob Nicholson, a number of questions in the House of 
Commons related to the government’s preparedness for such constitutional challenges. See House of 
Commons Debates, 41st Parl., 1st Sess., No. 103 (March 30, 2012) at 6739 (Hon. Irwin Cotler) 
[hereinafter “House of Commons Debates”]. 
11 David Daubney, “Sad day for Canadians” (March 11, 2012), online: David Daubney 
Blog <http://www.daviddaubney.com/2012/03/sad-day-for-canadians.html>. 
12 See, e.g., Paula Mallea, The Fear Factor: Stephen Harper’s “Tough on Crime” Agenda 
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2010); Michael Tonry, “The Mostly Unintended 
Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings” (2009) 38:1 Crime and 
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undertaken by legislators in the face of a massive body of evidence, 
accumulated over nearly 50 years, showing that minimum sentences not 
only do not deliver on their promise to deter crime,13 but that they have 
many negative, unintended effects such as fostering circumvention by 
justice system participants and reducing transparency and accountability 
by pushing discretion down to prosecutors rather than to sentencing 
judges.14 They create distortions in sentencing, ratcheting up the “floor” 
such that sentences become longer overall, with negative societal returns. 
Legislators pursue mandatory minimum sentences, in the face of such 
evidence, because they are seen as politically popular, appealing to large 
segments of the electorate who have little information about the princi-
ples and operation of the criminal justice system. However, research into 
public support for mandatory minimum sentences reveals a more 
complex picture in which the principle of proportionality (which is 
compromised by mandatory minimum sentences) is highly valued by 
members of the public.15 
The appeal of mandatory penalties is rooted in a distrust of the judi-
ciary. They are a pointed response to a perceived problem of lenient 
sentencing,16 a perception that virtually all members of the legal and 
judicial communities reject and that only tends to make any sense when 
one compares sentences in Canada to those in the United States, a 
jurisdiction which has (by far) the highest incarceration rate in the 
world.17 Results of Canadian public opinion polls show a perception of 
                                                                                                             
Justice 65 [hereinafter “Tonry”]; Mark Mauer, “The Impact of Mandatory Minimum Penalties in 
Federal Sentencing” (2010) 94:1 Judicature 6; Athar K. Malik, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences: 
Shackling Judicial Discretion for Justice or Political Expediency?” (2007) 53:2 Crim. L.Q. 236 
[hereinafter “Malik”]. See also the various articles published from the symposium, “Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences: Law & Policy” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 261. 
13 Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting 
the Null Hypothesis” (2003) 30 Crime and Justice 143. 
14 Tonry, supra, note 12. 
15 See Julian V. Roberts, “Public Opinion and Mandatory Sentencing: A Review of Interna-
tional Findings” (2003) 30 Criminal Justice and Behavior 483 (drawing on research in the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia). Roberts concludes that when presented with a 
summary of basic facts about real cases, members of the public tend to oppose mandatory minimum 
sentences. On the other hand, a general question, without context or reference to the range of cases 
that would be caught, nor to the various principles of sentencing, tends to elicit a more positive view 
of mandatory sentences. 
16 Roberts, Crutcher & Verbrugge, supra, note 7. 
17 As of 2011, the United States had the highest prison population rate in the world, at 743 
per 100,000 of the national population, followed by Rwanda (595) and Russia (568). Nearly 60 per 
cent of countries have prison populations below 150 per 100,000. Canada’s prison population in 
2011 was 117 per 100,000. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, 9th ed., online: 
International Centre for Prison Studies <http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-
9-22.pdf>. 
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leniency in sentencing, a finding that is consistent with polling data in 
other comparable jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom.18 
Given the critique of the judiciary that is implicit in the legislative 
adoption of mandatory sentences, it is interesting to examine how judges 
have dealt with challenges to the constitutionality of these provisions. As 
other commentators have noted, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
generally taken a deferential approach in these cases,19 setting a high 
threshold of “gross disproportionality” for a mandatory sentence to 
constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by section 12, and 
accepting mandatory sentences as a valid and proportionate legislative 
response to the goal of reducing crime and protecting society.20 
The most recent round of parliamentary and public debate around 
mandatory sentencing featured a higher level of opposition to the use of 
these provisions (at least in relation to drug offences) than had been seen 
in previous years.21 The assertion was often made that in addition to 
clogging the courts,22 the mandatory minimum sentences in Bill C-10 
will not withstand a constitutional challenge.23 Given the prominence of 
this debate, coinciding as it did with the Smickle decision which a 
number of commentators argue was a sign of constitutional challenges to 
come,24 this paper attempts to assess the impact that the Charter has had, 
and may have in the near future, on mandatory minimum sentences and 
their proliferation. To answer those questions, the paper will first briefly 
review the Supreme Court case law on the constitutionality of mandatory 
minimum sentences. The next two sections will outline the approach 
                                                                                                             
18 Roberts, Crutcher & Verbrugge, supra, note 7, at 83-84. 
19 See, e.g., Benjamin L. Berger, “A More Lasting Comfort? The Politics of Minimum 
Sentences, the Rule of Law and R. v. Ferguson” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 101, at 105 [hereinafter 
“Berger”]; Lisa Dufraimont, “R. v. Ferguson and the Search for a Coherent Approach to Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences under Section 12” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 459 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”]; 
Malik, supra, note 12; and Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith, The Constitutionality of Mandatory 
Sentences” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Searching for Smith’”]. 
20 I have noted in the related context of prisoners’ rights cases that, with a few notable ex-
ceptions, Canadian courts have continued a pre-Charter trend of deference to correctional decisions 
and policies. Debra Parkes, “A Prisoners’ Charter? Reflections on Prisoner Litigation Under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2007) 40:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 629. 
21 Lead Now, supra, note 8; The Canadian Press, supra, note 8. 
22 Kim Mackrael, “Tory crime bill to put pressure on courts,” The Globe and Mail (Decem-
ber 19, 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/tory-crime-bill-to-put-pressure-
on-courts/article2277143/>. 
23 House of Commons Debates, supra, note 10; CBC News Canada “What worries critics 
about omnibus crime bill”, CBC News (March 6, 2012), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/
news/canada/story/2012/03/06/f-bill-c10-objections.html>. 
24 Cristin Schmitz, “No win for default sentencing” The Lawyers Weekly (February 24, 
2012), at 1. 
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taken in the recent Smickle decision in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice before moving on to argue that courts should subject the pur-
ported goals, justifications and impacts of mandatory minimum sen-
tences to a more searching form of Charter scrutiny as we enter the 
fourth decade of the Charter’s operation. 
II. SECTION 12, MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES  
AND CHARTER MINIMALISM 
Smith25 is the starting point, and indeed the high-water mark, in the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of section 12 of the 
Charter which provides that “[e]veryone has the right not to be subjected 
to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”26 In Smith, a majority 
of the Court declared invalid a section of the Narcotic Control Act27 
which imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years impris-
onment for importing a narcotic into Canada. 
The majority decision penned by Lamer J. established that a section 
12 analysis will proceed in two stages when the constitutionality of a 
minimum sentence is challenged. First, the court must consider whether 
the minimum sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment based 
on the circumstances of the individual before the court. If the answer is 
no then the court will proceed to consider whether the minimum sentence 
would be cruel and unusual if applied to a “reasonable hypothetical”. In 
Smith, it was the reasonable hypothetical — a person with no criminal 
record who brings a single marijuana joint across the border — that the 
Court found to violate section 12. Smith himself had been convicted of 
importing seven-and-a-half ounces of cocaine. Ultimately, the majority 
states that the standard to be applied is one of “gross disproportionality” 
and not whether the sentence is “merely excessive”.28 For the first-time 
offender with one joint, it is not particularly difficult to conclude that the 
seven years in prison is grossly disproportionate. 
                                                                                                             
25 Smith, supra, note 5. 
26 Supra, note 6; for a discussion of the pre-Charter roots and interpretation of the prohibi-
tion against “cruel and unusual punishment”, see Michael Jackson, “Cruel and Unusual Treatment or 
Punishment?” (1982) Charter Edition U.B.C. L. Rev. 189. 
27 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, s. 5(2). The Narcotic Control Act was later replaced by the Con-
trolled Drugs and Substances Act, supra, note 3, which now includes numerous mandatory 
minimum sentences. 
28 Smith, supra, note 5, at para. 55. 
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The decision in Smith rejected the suggestion that prosecutorial dis-
cretion (i.e., to lay a lesser charge or to proceed summarily where that is 
an option) can render valid a mandatory minimum sentence that violates 
section 12 in its application either to the individual before the court or 
based on a reasonable hypothetical.29 The Court rejected the notion that 
the responsibility to mitigate the potentially unconstitutional severity of a 
mandatory sentence could be assigned to prosecutors, parole boards or 
anyone else.30 This issue features in a significant way in Smickle, since 
the offence in issue is a hybrid one whereby the Crown may proceed by 
indictment (in which case the mandatory three-year sentence applies) or 
by summary conviction (in which case there is a maximum sentence of 
one year in jail and no mandatory minimum). 
Since Smith, the Supreme Court has found only one other sentence to 
violate section 12. In Steele v. Mountain Institution,31 the Court held that 
the continued detention of a man who had been imprisoned for 37 years 
under an earlier incarnation of a dangerous offender provision was 
grossly disproportionate. However, the Court stressed the particular facts 
of the case, stating that the test must be “stringent and demanding” so as 
not to “trivialize the Charter”.32 
Kent Roach has characterized the post-Smith Supreme Court deci-
sions upholding mandatory minimum sentences as moving from activism 
to minimalism in interpreting and applying section 12.33 For example, in 
R. v. Morrisey,34 a majority of the Court insisted that any reasonable 
hypothetical must be common (for example, unfortunate hunting acci-
dents), going so far as to exclude the facts of real, reported cases that 
were considered unusual or rare.35 This deferential approach represents a 
significant departure from Smith, where the willingness to centre the 
analysis around an uncommon, yet reasonable hypothetical fact situation 
meant that the invalidity of the seven-year mandatory minimum could be 
addressed directly, without waiting for an inevitable injustice to actually 
happen. Roach notes that “[g]iven the realities of both prosecutorial 
discretion and plea bargaining, it might have taken forever for the perfect 
                                                                                                             
29 Id., at paras. 68-69. 
30 Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 382. 
31 [1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385 (S.C.C.). 
32 Id., at 1417. 
33 Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 381-86. 
34 [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”]. 
35 Id., at para. 50. 
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small-time offender — the teenaged student coming home from Florida 
with a joint of marijuana — to have appeared before the Court.”36 
In addition to limiting the scope of reasonable hypotheticals, the 
Court in the post-Smith cases accepts as constitutionally valid the way 
that mandatory minimum sentences raise the floor set by Parliament and 
ratchet up sentences generally. Justice Arbour dissented in Morrisey, 
although she did not find the four-year mandatory minimum sentence 
invalid, expressing concerns about the “inflationary floor” and the 
potential that it could be grossly disproportionate in individual cases.37 
Jamie Cameron has characterized the interpretation of section 12 by 
the Supreme Court post-Smith as a “faint hope” provision that should be 
reinvigorated.38 As a companion argument to a proposal that section 7 
should be limited to procedural review, Cameron argues that section 12 
should do more analytical work to address substantive criminal law. In 
particular, she argues that section 12 should require proportionality 
between fault and punishment, not simply focus on (gross) dispropor-
tionality. She is also critical of the way that the Supreme Court has 
considered fault, in an abstract, de-contextualized way in section 12 
analysis.39 
In R. v. Latimer,40 the Supreme Court rejected an argument that the 
mandatory minimum sentence for murder (a life sentence with no parole 
eligibility for at least 10 years) was grossly disproportionate in the case 
of a father who killed his daughter who had a serious physical disability, 
a case of so-called “compassionate killing”.41 The Court took a highly 
deferential stance, stating that “[t]he choice is Parliament’s on the use of 
minimum sentences, though considerable difference of opinion continues 
                                                                                                             
36 Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 382. 
37 Morrisey, supra, note 34, at para. 82. 
38 Jamie Cameron, “Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” in 
J. Cameron & J. Stribopoulos, eds., (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 553, at 583. 
39 Id., at 588. See also Kent Roach, “The Charter versus the Government’s Crime Agenda” 
in (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) (forthcoming) [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Charter versus Government’”]. 
40 [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Latimer”]. 
41 This characterization of Robert Latimer’s killing of his daughter, Tracy, as compassion-
ate is contested by disability rights groups who argue that calls for leniency in relation to Robert 
Latimer necessarily devalue the lives of people with disabilities. See Isabel Grant, “Rethinking the 
Sentencing Regime for Murder” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 655, for an argument that this 
approach, as well as the opposing position that Tracy’s death was a mercy killing for which Latimer 
should not be culpable, both miss the mark. She argues that the Latimer case (and others) demon-
strate that the sentencing regime for murder should be changed to eliminate the harsh minimum 
parole ineligibility periods, maintain the distinction between murder and manslaughter, and build in 
flexibility to allow judges to tailor the sentence to fit the crime. 
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on the wisdom of employing minimum sentences from a criminal law 
policy or penological point of view.”42 
On the other hand, R. v. Wust43 is an example of the Supreme Court 
acknowledging the disproportionate impact of mandatory minimum 
sentences, albeit not in the context of interpreting section 12. Justice 
Arbour makes it clear: 
Mandatory minimum sentences are not the norm in this country, and 
they depart from the general principles of sentencing expressed in the 
Code, in the case law, and in the literature on sentencing. In particular, 
they often detract from what Parliament has expressed as the 
fundamental principle of sentencing in s. 718.1 of the Code: the 
principle of proportionality.44 
It is important to keep in mind that the decision in Wust did not require a 
finding of Charter invalidity. It was merely a matter of statutory interpre-
tation that credit for pre-trial custody could be considered by the sentenc-
ing judge to reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum. To do 
otherwise would lead to the absurd result that a “best offender” who 
received the minimum sentence (with no credit for pre-trial custody) 
could serve more time than a “worse” offender who deserved a longer 
sentence but was credited for pre-trial custody.45 
The most recent consideration of a mandatory minimum sentence by 
the Supreme Court came in the 2008 decision in R. v. Ferguson.46 In that 
case, the Court cleared up years of uncertainty in the jurisprudence by 
rejecting the use of constitutional exemptions to address exceptional 
cases in which gross disproportionality would result from the imposition 
of a mandatory minimum sentence. Chief Justice McLachlin held that the 
legislative objective behind mandatory minimum sentences is the 
removal of judicial discretion such that a constitutional exemption would 
                                                                                                             
42 Latimer, supra, note 40, at para. 88. 
43 [2000] S.C.J. No. 19, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wust”]. 
44 Id., at para. 18. 
45 Id., at para. 42. 
46 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”]. A subsequent 
decision which addressed Charter issues in the context of mandatory minimum sentences but not on 
the basis of s. 12 was R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Nasogaluak”]. In that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of sentencing 
judges to consider police or other state misconduct, whether amounting to a Charter violation or not, 
as a mitigating factor that could reduce a sentence. Nasogaluak was an Indigenous man who was 
badly beaten by the police in the course of his arrest for impaired driving. A unanimous Supreme 
Court held that in “exceptional cases” it may even be appropriate to sentence below a mandatory 
minimum sentence to provide a meaningful remedy for unconstitutional acts. However, on the facts 
of the case, the minimum sentence of a $600 fine for a first offence of impaired driving was upheld. 
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be an unacceptable remedy. She went on to comment that if a law did 
lead to gross disproportionality in a particular case (a finding she was not 
willing to make in relation to Ferguson47), the Court would have to 
declare the provision invalid.48 In an article published shortly after 
Ferguson, Benjamin Berger suggested that the Court’s rejection of 
constitutional exemptions “amounts to a constitutional push-back on the 
politics of minimum sentences”.49 
The next section considers a recent Ontario Superior Court decision 
which may be characterized as just such a constitutional push-back on 
the (lack of) logic behind at least one minimum sentence. The reasoning 
of the Court and the potential implications of this case will be addressed. 
III. SMICKLE: FERGUSON COMING HOME TO ROOST? 
In the early morning hours of the night he was charged, Leroy 
Smickle was lounging in his underwear in his cousin’s apartment, 
holding a loaded gun in one hand and a laptop in the other, taking a 
webcam photo of himself to post on Facebook. At that moment, the 
police, bearing a search warrant, broke into the apartment looking for 
illegal firearms believed to be owned by Smickle’s cousin. Smickle was 
convicted of possession of a loaded firearm and careless storage of a 
firearm. This “foolish act” as described by the judge did not warrant the 
three-year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of a loaded 
firearm which applied because the Crown had proceeded by indictment 
pursuant to section 95(2) of the Criminal Code.50 She found that a three-
year sentence would be grossly disproportionate, amounting to cruel and 
unusual punishment contrary to section 12 of the Charter. 
With respect to the Smith standard that cruel and unusual punishment 
requires a finding of gross disproportionality, Molloy J. looked to the 
way that (arguably) subjective elements had been adopted as part of the 
standard. In particular, she considered the language of “[shocking] the 
conscience” and “[outraging] standards of decency” such that Canadians 
                                                                                                             
47 Ferguson, supra, note 46, involved a police officer fatally shooting a man detained in 
police cells following an altercation between the two men. The officer was originally charged with 
murder but a jury convicted him of manslaughter, which carried a minimum four-year sentence 
because it was committed with a firearm. 
48 Ferguson, supra, note 46, at para. 57. 
49 Berger, supra, note 19, at 105. 
50 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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“would find the punishment abhorrent or intolerable”.51 However, she 
held that the test was largely an objective one: 
I remain of the view that the analysis of what constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment is essentially an objective test. To the extent that 
community tolerance is part of that test, it can only be with reference to 
a community fully informed about the philosophy, principles and 
purposes of sentencing set out in the Criminal Code, the rights 
enshrined in the Charter, and the particular circumstances of the case 
before the court.52 
Justice Molloy stated that she would have reached the conclusion that the 
mandatory three-year sentence was grossly disproportionate on either an 
objective or subjective test: “In my opinion, a reasonable person ... 
would consider a three year sentence to be fundamentally unfair, outra-
geous, abhorrent and intolerable.”53 
The unique nature of this particular offence played a central role in 
Smickle. The fact that the offence is a hybrid one with a summary option 
that has no minimum sentence and a one-year maximum looms large. 
This bifurcation and accompanying Crown discretion indicates that 
Parliament has recognized that there are some circumstances in which 
possession of a loaded firearm may justify no prison sentence at all.54 
Justice Molloy concluded that the case before her was exceptional 
because of the nature and purpose of the possession, meaning that an 
appropriate sentence would lie outside the normal range. In deciding on a 
one-year conditional sentence, she canvassed three comparator cases, 
including one involving a former Ontario cabinet minister, John Sno-
belen, who had received an absolute discharge for the same offence in a 
case where the Crown had proceeded summarily.55 
In Smickle the structure of the hybrid scheme for prosecuting this 
offence (a one-year maximum jail sentence if the Crown proceeds 
summarily and a three-year minimum prison sentence if the Crown 
proceeds by indictment) was held to be arbitrary and therefore breach 
                                                                                                             
51 Smickle, supra, note 9, at paras. 42-46, citing Smith, supra, note 5, and other s. 12 cases. 
52 Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 47. 
53 Id., at para. 89. 
54 Id., at paras. 52-53. 
55 R. v. Snobelen (April 25 2008), unreported (Ont. C.J.) Brown J., cited in Smickle, supra, 
note 9, at paras. 69-70. Snobelen knowingly had a Colt 22 semiautomatic handgun, together with 
ammunition and two other firearms, in his home for a number of years. He had acquired them when 
he bought a ranch and its contents in Oklahoma. He testified that he had intended to turn the guns in, 
but neglected to do so. The guns were discovered during a police search based on information from 
Snobelen’s estranged wife. 
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section 7 of the Charter. It is impossible to have a sentence in the two-
year gap between the one-year maximum and three-year minimum 
sentence. The existence of this two-year gap is clearly irrational.56 In so 
finding Molloy J. relied on much of the reasoning of Code J. in R. v. 
Nur57 (in which Nur was ultimately unsuccessful in his challenge to the 
same mandatory minimum sentence). Justice Code found a violation of 
section 7 but found that Nur lacked standing to raise it because he was 
not within the range of people “who would reasonably have faced 
summary proceedings, but for the arbitrary two year ‘gap’” in section 
95(2)(b).58 
Having found that section 95(2)(b) violated section 12 and section 7 
of the Charter, Molloy J. proceeded to consider whether the limit on 
rights was justified as a reasonable limit pursuant to section 1 of the 
Charter. Noting that section 7 violations are rarely salvageable by section 
1 and expressing doubt that “inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on 
an individual can be justified based on an overall legislative objective of 
general deterrence,”59 Molloy J. spent most of her time on minimal 
impairment, focusing on arguments about whether and how a “safety 
valve” of discretion could save the section. The Crown argued that the 
existing prosecutorial discretion was the necessary safety valve, while 
the defence asserted that only judicial discretion to depart from the 
mandatory minimum sentence (i.e., through a constitutional exemption 
or other means) in exceptional cases could render the law valid.60 
The Court rejected the Crown’s argument, noting that prosecutorial 
discretion did not operate to prevent Smickle from being subjected to 
cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Molloy did not find fault with the 
Crown’s decision to proceed by indictment against Smickle, stating that 
“[a]t the time that decision was made, the Crown was not in possession 
of all of the facts necessary to inform that decision. The decision was 
                                                                                                             
56 The version of s. 95(2) included in the 1996 amendments to the Code provided for a 
maximum one-year sentence (summary conviction) and a minimum one-year sentence (indictable). 
The new, three-year minimum for an indictable offence was added in the 2008 amendments without 
apparent consideration of the resulting “two-year gap”. See R. v. Nur, [2011] O.J. No. 3878, 275 
C.C.C. (3d) 330, at para. 131 [hereinafter “Nur”]. 
57 Id. 
58 Id., at para. 140. 
59 Id., at para. 101. 
60 In a similar vein, the Canadian Bar Association argued in its submissions to Parliament 
on Bill C-10 that such a judicial safety valve should be incorporated into any legislated minimum 
sentence to address Charter concerns and the principle of proportionality. Canadian Bar Association, 
Submission on Bill C-10: Safe Streets and Communities Act, online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/
submissions/PDF/11-45-eng.pdf> [hereinafter “Canadian Bar Association”]. 
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made reasonably and in good faith and there is no basis to interfere with 
it.”61 However, she cited Smith for the proposition that the “safety valve” 
of Crown discretion cannot save legislation that may result in a grossly 
disproportionate sentence: “... the courts are duty bound to make that 
pronouncement [that a law is invalid pursuant to section 52(1)], not to 
delegate the avoidance of a violation to the prosecution or to anyone else 
for that matter.”62 
The defence argued that a judicial safety valve, effectively trans-
forming mandatory sentences into presumptive sentences from which a 
judge could depart in exceptional circumstances or where an injustice 
would result from their imposition, would be a minimally impairing 
alternative to the rigid mandatory minimum in section 95(2)(b). The 
Crown had argued that such judicial discretion would defeat the whole 
purpose of the legislation which is to ensure stiffer sentences for posses-
sion of loaded firearms by taking away judicial discretion, a proposition 
which the court in Smickle rejected. Justice Molloy agreed with the 
defence that such an approach, utilized in the United Kingdom and South 
Africa, is a minimally impairing alternative.63 
At the final stage of proportionality, she notes pointedly that “there is 
no tangible evidence that imposing a mandatory minimum does anything 
to actually accomplish [the objectives of reducing violent crime and 
protecting the public]. One might hope that would be the case, but 
proving it is a far different matter.”64 
The Crown argued in Smickle that if the minimum sentence was 
found to violate section 12 on Smickle’s facts, the appropriate remedy 
should be some form of mandamus or a reduction of sentence. However, 
Molloy J. did not accept this argument, noting that both proposed 
remedies amount to constitutional exemptions which were flatly rejected 
by the Supreme Court in Ferguson. In accordance with that decision, a 
declaration of invalidity is the only remedy available to a judge who has 
found that a mandatory sentence violates section 12 and is not saved by 
section 1. Furthermore, it is significant that the Crown’s call for a 
suspended declaration of invalidity was flatly rejected by the Court in 
Smickle. While suspended declarations have become almost common-
                                                                                                             
61 Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 87. 
62 Smith, supra, note 5, at para. 69, cited in Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 109.  
63 Smickle, supra, note 9, at paras. 114-116; see also Julian V. Roberts, Mandatory Sen-
tences of Imprisonment in Common Law Jurisdictions: Some Representative Models, online: 
Department of Justice <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2005/rr05_10/index.html>. 
64 Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 120. 
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place in Charter decisions, Molloy J. returned to the high threshold 
articulated in Schachter v. Canada,65 namely, that delaying the effect of a 
declaration of invalidity should be rare and exceptional.66 This more 
stringent approach is welcome, both in this case because a suspended 
declaration would have deprived Leroy Smickle of any remedy,67 and in 
the law more broadly because suspended declarations have been prolifer-
ating, based on appeals to “dialogue” between courts and legislatures,68 
rather than for the limited reasons articulated in Schachter. 
In the end, Leroy Smickle spent a significant amount of time in jail 
pending trial, notwithstanding the ultimate disposition of a one-year 
conditional sentence. When he was on bail he was under strict conditions 
amounting to house arrest. He received seven months’ credit for time 
served and for restrictions on his liberty while on bail. Smickle certainly 
paid for his “foolish act”. 
IV. SMICKLE AND A POSSIBLE DEPARTURE FROM  
CHARTER MINIMALISM 
For some time, criminal and constitutional law scholars have been 
lamenting the minimalist, deferential approach to Charter scrutiny of 
mandatory minimum sentences. In 2001, reacting to the decisions in R. v. 
Goltz69 and Morrisey, Kent Roach called for a return to the activism of 
Smith, arguing that “vigorous judicial enforcement against cruel and 
unusual punishment by striking down mandatory sentences has the 
potential to produce a robust and democratic dialogue between the courts 
and the legislature that considers both the effect of punishment on 
offenders and the adequacy of less draconian alternatives.”70 
Writing in the wake of Ferguson, Lisa Dufraimont and Benjamin 
Berger took different approaches to the future of section 12 challenges to 
mandatory minimum sentences. Dufraimont interpreted the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
65 [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Schachter”]. 
66 Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 151. 
67 See Kent Roach, “New and Problematic Restrictions on Constitutional Remedies: R. v. 
Demers” Editorial Comment (2004) 49:3 Crim. L.Q. 253 (discussing the injustice involved in the 
refusal to permit a constitutional exemption from a delayed declaration of invalidity in the context of 
an individual with a chronic mental disability who was found unfit to stand trial). 
68 Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, “Putting the Past Behind Us? Prospective Judicial and 
Legislative Constitutional Remedies” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 205; Bruce Ryder, “Suspending the 
Charter” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 267. 
69 [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Goltz”]. 
70 Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 411. 
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rejection of constitutional exemptions as a retreat from substantive 
scrutiny of mandatory minimum sentences and a “lost opportunity” to 
provide a remedy for exceptional cases that will inevitably be caught 
within the wide net of mandatory penalties.71 On the other hand, Berger 
argued that Ferguson amounted to a “constitutional push-back on the 
politics of minimum sentences”.72 He supported the Court’s rejection of a 
role for the judiciary in “mopping up the hard cases with constitutional 
exemptions”, which would lend legitimacy to a legislative process that 
may not have paid sufficient attention to the substantive fairness of the 
laws it creates.73 While Dufraimont essentially argued that the spectre of 
invalidating a mandatory sentence for all purposes, based on an excep-
tional case, would exert substantial pressure on judges to uphold laws in 
the face of compelling exceptional cases that might arise, Berger ex-
pressed more confidence in the ability and willingness of sentencing 
judges — and implicitly appellate courts — to make unpopular decisions 
when faced with compelling cases. 
How, then, should we understand Smickle? Is it a courageous deci-
sion in the face of immense pressure? And what is the Supreme Court of 
Canada likely to do when this case inevitably comes before it? Might 
Smickle signal a new, more rigorous approach to assessing mandatory 
minimum sentences under the Charter?74 
On one level, the application of sections 7 and 12 of the Charter in 
Smickle addresses the worst, most irrational elements of the law. The 
two-year gap that arose through piecemeal amendments to the Criminal 
Code, ratcheting up the floor for this offence, is rightly found to be 
arbitrary. In fact, the two-year gap is completely irrational and it is 
surprising that it had not been addressed earlier by the courts or Parlia-
ment.75 This was, in many ways, an easy case. That said, outside of Smith 
and Steele, the Supreme Court has not been persuaded to utilize section 
                                                                                                             
71 Dufraimont, supra, note 19, at 470. See also Kent Roach, “The Future of Mandatory 
Sentences after the Death of Constitutional Exemptions” Editorial Comment (2008) 54:1 Crim. L.Q. 1. 
72 Berger, supra, note 19, at 105. 
73 Id., at 119. 
74 As this manuscript was being finalized for publication, another decision to declare a 
mandatory minimum sentence invalid was released: R. v. L. (C.), [2012] O.J. No. 3094, 2012 ONCJ 
413 (Ont. C.J.) (mandatory three-year sentence for the broadly framed offence of trafficking a 
firearm). 
75 In Nur, supra, note 56, at para. 131, Code J. had reviewed the legislative history of the 
provision and concluded that the two-year gap was probably an oversight that had not been 
corrected. He found a violation of s. 7 but declined to address it because an appropriate sentence for 
Nur was outside of the gap. 
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12 in cases that presented sympathetic facts, although some lower courts 
have.76 
It is possible to conclude that the positions of both Berger and 
Dufraimont have been vindicated by Smickle, at least at this early stage. 
Given the indefensible arbitrariness of the two-year gap between the 
maximum summary conviction sentence and the minimum indictable 
offence sentence, the result was inevitable and obvious to many. Justice 
Code had as much as said so in Nur. Justice Molloy just finally had the 
facts. However, the very fact that Code J. did not declare the law invalid 
in Nur when he was faced with the section 7 arbitrariness argument is an 
example of Charter minimalism in operation. 
Dufraimont has argued that “[t]he fundamental problem is that the 
persistence of an invalid mandatory minimum sentence has distorting 
effects,”77 such as exerting pressure on accused persons to plead to lesser 
offences to avoid overly broad mandatory minimum sentences. Liz 
Sheehy has noted the distorting effects of mandatory sentences, particu-
larly for battered women who are charged with murder in relation to the 
death of their abusive partners.78 In the course of her section 1 analysis in 
Smickle, Molloy J. listed this and a number of other “deleterious effects 
of the mandatory minimum regime”, including the following: 
(1) the sentence inflation for persons who, although not deserving a 
sentence of less than a one year sentence, must now receive at least 
three years; (2) the danger of increased recidivism by incarcerating 
youthful first offenders for extended periods of time with hardened 
criminals; (3) contributing to the over-crowded conditions in our 
correctional facilities; (4) the systemic disincentive for guilty pleas and 
early resolutions if the minimum sentence will be three years in prison 
for any offender charged with the indictable offence; and, (5) as the 
Supreme Court noted in Smith, the unfair advantage given to the Crown 
as an accused will be under pressure to plead guilty to a lesser included 
offence in order to avoid the risk of the mandatory minimum.79 
Given the deferential, minimalist approach that has been taken to 
section 12, the focus of much commentary has been on the “exceptional 
                                                                                                             
76 For example, the sentencing judges in Morrisey, supra, note 34, and Latimer, supra, note 
40, had found the mandatory sentence to be grossly disproportionate. However, those findings were 
reversed on appeal. 
77 Dufraimont, supra, note 19, at 477, citing Smith, supra, note 5, at para. 5. 
78 Elizabeth Sheehy, “Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2001) 39:2&3 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 529. 
79 Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 121. 
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cases” that are caught by the rising threshold of the sentencing floor and 
the need for a judicial “safety valve”.80 If the Supreme Court had 
authorized a judicial “safety valve” in the form of a constitutional 
exemption in Ferguson,81 arguably Parliament’s intention to treat gun 
crimes more harshly across the board could have been largely satisfied as 
long as constitutional exemptions were rarely applied. The impact of 
such a change, namely providing a remedy for “exceptional cases”, 
would arguably be modest.82 Perhaps a more significant change would be 
for the Supreme Court to revisit the narrow approach to reasonable 
hypotheticals taken in Goltz and Morrisey, authorizing consideration of a 
whole range of potential scenarios. However, if the high standard of 
“gross disproportionality” continues to be applied, then such a change 
does little to address the fundamentally arbitrary nature of mandatory 
minimum sentences. 
Arguments that lend legitimacy to the ratcheting up of sentences 
generally by simply increasing the starting point for the sentence and 
maintaining proportionality are problematic in the sense that they leave 
the inflationary starting point unscrutinized. As argued by Roach, they 
“aspire to a just distribution of punishment while being agnostic about 
the justness of the starting point or anchor for their finely calibrated 
scale”.83 He goes on to make the important point that “judicial concerns 
about maintaining proportionality in light of mandatory sentences 
attribute a coherence to Parliament’s decision to enact a mandatory 
sentence that is not realistic.”84 
The bigger picture that emerges when one considers the proliferation 
of mandatory minimum sentences through piecemeal changes to our 
sentencing laws, and the Charter decisions mostly upholding them, is an 
                                                                                                             
80 See e.g., Dufraimont, supra, note 19; Canadian Bar Association, supra, note 60. 
81 Proponents of this approach essentially advocate for the transformation of mandatory 
minimum sentences into presumptive sentences, along the lines of the model in the United Kingdom. 
See also Morris J. Fish, “An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment” 
(2008) 28:1 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 57, at 71 (“Whether Canada should move [in the direction of 
presumptive sentences] from the mandatory sentencing scheme currently in place is, in principle, a 
matter for Parliament to decide”). 
82 Kent Roach advocates for such a focus on the disproportionate effects of a particular 
mandatory sentence on a particular (exceptional) offender, rather than on attempts to prove that the 
mandatory sentence is arbitrary in relation to its legislative objective. Roach, “Charter versus 
Government”, supra, note 39. I sketch out some elements of the latter, admittedly more expansive, 
argument below. 
83 Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 402. 
84 Id., at 403, drawing on Julian V. Roberts, “The Hunt for the Paper Tiger: Conditional 
Sentencing after Brady” (1999) 42:1 Crim. L.Q. 38. 
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overall sense of irrationality and arbitrariness.85 The Criminal Code is 
desperately in need of a principled, evidence-based overhaul.86 However, 
there are no prospects for such changes any time soon. To the contrary, 
the lack of respect for — and indeed, open hostility to — research that 
contradicts the policy choices of the current government is palpable.87 
In a recent op-ed piece published in the Ottawa Citizen on the 30th 
anniversary of the Charter, Kent Roach argued that 
there are signs that the Charter will not provide significant restraints on 
increased use of mandatory sentences and increased use of prison. ... 
[T]he Charter, like the media, tends to focus only on the worst cases of 
abuse; not the routine cases. New restrictions on conditional sentences 
and mandatory sentences will change how routine cases are processed 
everyday in court.88 
Roach suggests the Charter will probably have little to say about that. 
In this climate, judges will likely continue to chip away at the most 
obvious injustices. Section 12 comes into play in Smickle, but only in 
relation to an “exceptional case” that, I would argue, merely points to 
deeper problems with mandatory sentences generally. These exceptional 
cases are the canaries in the coal mine that should prompt a reassessment 
of our reliance on counter-productive, blunt instruments such as manda-
tory minimum sentences. The decision in Smickle does not, and perhaps 
                                                                                                             
85 As just one demonstration of incoherence among provisions in the Criminal Code, the 
factum of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association in Nur, supra, note 56, compares the sentences 
available under s. 95(2) for possession of a loaded firearm — a maximum one-year sentence or a 
minimum three-year sentence — to sentences available for other crimes involving guns. Under s. 
87(1) there is no mandatory minimum for pointing a loaded or unloaded firearm at someone; under 
s. 85(1) there is a mandatory minimum sentence of one year for using a firearm while committing or 
attempting to commit an indictable offence (such as aggravated assault); and under s. 220(a) there is 
a mandatory minimum sentence of four years for criminal negligence causing death where a firearm 
is used. Nur, supra, note 56 (Factum of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, at para. 53). 
86 Beyond the sentencing framework, Don Stuart has long argued for a General Part to the 
Criminal Code which would set out important principles and that would assist in interpreting and 
rationalizing the offences, defences and procedures in Canadian criminal law. Don Stuart, “A Case 
for a General Part: Lessons from Canada’s Experience with Stephen’s Code Since 1892 and 
Entrenched Charter Standards since 1982” (2009) 20:1 Crim. L.F. 113. 
87 For example, in recent hearings before the House of Commons Committee considering 
Bill C-10, Conservative members of the Committee dismissed as “advocates for criminals” and “too 
far removed from real life” witnesses such as Dr. Anthony Doob, one of North America’s leading 
criminologists, and Catherine Latimer, Executive Director of the John Howard Society and a former 
Director General of Youth Justice, Strategic Initiatives and Law Reform, with the federal Department 
of Justice. See Heather Scoffield, “Critics of omnibus bill ‘advocate for criminals,’ Conservatives 
charge” The Globe and Mail (October 18, 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
politics/critics-of-omnibus-bill-advocate-for-criminals-conservatives-charge/article4255428/>. 
88 Kent Roach, “The government v. the Charter” The Ottawa Citizen (April 13, 2012) at B7. 
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cannot, speak to the overall arbitrariness of popular punitivism and to the 
disproportionality of mandatory sentences generally. 
One of the most problematic implications of the virtually unre-
strained proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences is the extent to 
which prosecutorial discretion increases. A very significant result of the 
move to mandatory minimum sentences is a wholesale transfer of 
discretion from judges to prosecutors. Whether intended or not, this 
move signals a profound lack of trust in judges (whose decisions are, of 
course, reviewable through the appellate process) and a simultaneous 
transfer of discretion, and implicitly trust, to Crown Attorneys (whose 
decisions are virtually unassailable due to the high degree of deference 
accorded to prosecutorial discretion which is reviewable only for abuse 
of process).89 In Nur, a case that raised essentially the same issues as 
Smickle (although the mitigating circumstances were not as sympathetic 
in Nur), the sentencing judge held that the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in proceeding by indictment or summary conviction was a 
“complete answer” to all of the reasonable hypotheticals which he found 
would amount to cruel and unusual punishment.90 
Research largely conducted in the United States where there is now a 
long history of mandatory minimum sentences reveals that “charge 
bargaining” and other forms of evading the impact of mandatory mini-
mums increase with the proliferation of minimum sentences.91 These and 
other consequences are unintended and raise the spectre of arbitrariness, 
which has been defined by the Supreme Court in the section 7 case law 
as a measure that “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the 
objective”.92 To the extent that a key objective of mandatory sentences is, 
as held by McLachlin C.J.C. in Ferguson,93 the removal of judicial 
discretion in pursuit of greater certainty and consistency in sentencing, 
most mandatory minimum sentences could be said to entail arbitrary 
                                                                                                             
89 In R. v. Nixon, [2011] S.C.J. No. 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of 
Canada recently reaffirmed that prosecutorial discretion is reviewable only for abuse of process. The 
Crown’s repudiation of a signed plea agreement in that case was held not to amount to an abuse of 
process. 
90 Nur, supra, note 56, at paras. 104, 108. 
91 Tonry, supra, note 12. 
92 Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, at 
para. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”], McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., citing Rodriguez v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at para. 203 
(S.C.C.), McLachlin J. dissenting. 
93 Ferguson, supra, note 46, at para. 54. 
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deprivations of liberty.94 Ultimately, mandatory sentences do not remove 
discretion; they simply transfer it from judges to Crown attorneys. That 
result is inconsistent with the objective of removing discretion. At a 
minimum, the approach that the Supreme Court has taken to the arbi-
trariness standard in criminal law should prompt greater scrutiny of the 
relationship between the objective(s) of mandatory minimum sentences, 
including other objectives such as deterring crime, and the extent to 
which their consequences seem to be quite different and, in fact, dispro-
portionately borne by certain groups over others. 
Elizabeth Sheehy has drawn attention to the extent that mandatory 
minimum sentences have a disproportionate impact on certain racialized 
groups such as African Canadians and Indigenous peoples.95 A number of 
the mandatory minimum sentence cases involve Indigenous or African 
Canadian men: Morrisey, Nasogaluak, Nur, Smickle, and presumably 
others that we do not know about. David Tanovich has lamented the 
extent to which race is erased in criminal Charter cases, arguing that 
“there has been a large-scale failure of trial lawyers to raise race once 
critical race standards have been established by the courts,”96 particularly 
in relation to racial profiling. Tanovich has further argued that courts 
have ignored the “Golden principle” in Charter cases (the Golden 
principle being that “[t]he Charter must be interpreted with a critical race 
or anti-racist lens to give effect to systemic racism in the criminal justice 
system including the over-policing of Aboriginal and racialized commu-
                                                                                                             
94 In the most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision to consider arbitrariness as a prin-
ciple of fundamental justice, Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 
S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”], the unanimous Court found that the 
decision of the federal government to not grant an exemption to a safe-injection program from the 
relevant offences in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act was arbitrary. With respect to the state 
of the law on arbitrariness, the Court noted, at para. 132: 
The jurisprudence on arbitrariness is not entirely settled. In Chaoulli, three justices (per 
McLachlin C.J. and Major J.) preferred an approach that asked whether a limit was “ne-
cessary” to further the state objective: paras. 131-132. Conversely, three other justices 
(per Binnie and LeBel JJ.), preferred to avoid the language of necessity and instead ap-
proved of the prior articulation of arbitrariness as where “[a] deprivation of a right ... 
bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the state interest that lies behind the legisla-
tion”: para. 232. It is unnecessary to determine which approach should prevail, because 
the government action at issue in this case qualifies as arbitrary under both definitions. 
95 Elizabeth Sheehy, “The Discriminatory Effects of Bill C-15’s Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences” (2010) 70:2 C.R. (6th) 302 (the mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offences 
that Sheehy was addressing in this article were later rolled into Bill C-10 and passed into law earlier 
this year). See also Faizal R. Mirza, “Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentencing and Systemic Racism” 
(2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 491. 
96 David M. Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining 
Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 655, at 672. 
168 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
nities”).97 In addition to race playing a significant role in policing,98 
particularly where there is considerable discretion involved, it has been 
found to play a salient role in prosecutorial decisions. Research in the 
United States has found that members of certain racialized groups (such 
as African-Americans and Latin-Americans) are disproportionately 
subject to mandatory minimum sentences due to the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion.99 
In the Canadian context, the Supreme Court has openly acknowl-
edged the systemic discrimination experienced by Indigenous peoples in 
the Canadian criminal justice system, particularly in cases dealing with 
sentencing100 and imprisonment.101 Yet it is exceedingly difficult to 
reconcile the elimination of judicial discretion entailed by the enactment 
of mandatory minimums, in a context where Indigenous people are 
grossly over-represented among those imprisoned, with the direction to 
sentencing judges in section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code that “all 
available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the 
circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular 
attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.”102 This is one of 
the many contradictions and incoherencies in our criminal law that 
                                                                                                             
97 David M. Tanovich, “Ignoring the Golden Principle of Charter Interpretation?” (2008) 42 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 441, at 443. 
98 See generally Elizabeth Comack, Racialized Policing: Aboriginal People’s Encounters 
with the Police (Halifax: Fernwood, 2012), at ch. 2. 
99 Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, “Racial Disparities under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums” 9:4 J. Empirical 
Legal Stud. (forthcoming in December 2012). Although there has been little, if any, focused research 
into the relationship between prosecutorial discretion and race in the Canadian context, there have 
been some disturbing recent cases of Crown misconduct involving racialized accused who were 
subject to police brutality and later had their own charges stayed. See David M. Tanovich, “Bonds: 
Gendered and Racialized Violence, Strip Searches, Sexual Assault and Abuse of Prosecutorial 
Power” (2011) 79 C.R. (6th) 132. This is an area that requires further Canadian research such that 
the impact of prosecutorial discretion in the context of mandatory sentences is better understood. 
100 R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”]. 
101 Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé”]. 
102 The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 
13, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 265 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”] amounts to a call for action to lawyers and 
judges across the country who have not implemented s. 718.2(e) and the principles articulated in 
Gladue, supra, note 100 in a meaningful way. Justice LeBel took great pains to emphasize the 
importance of an individualized consideration of Gladue factors in every case involving an 
Indigenous person. To do otherwise would violate the fundamental principle of proportionality and 
invite appellate review (Ipeelee, at para. 87). A number of Indigenous leaders have criticized Bill 
C-10 on the basis that it will exacerbate the over-representation of Indigenous people in Canadian 
prisons. See Robert Everett-Green, “Law and disorder: What Bill C-10 could mean for Canada’s 
native people” The Globe and Mail (February 18, 2012), at F1. 
(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) MINIMAL IMPACT ON MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES 169 
should not be ignored when considering whether a mandatory sentence 
violates the Charter. 
V. CONCLUSION AND CHALLENGES NOTWITHSTANDING 
It has been argued that “[g]ross disproportionality and arbitrariness 
review [under section 7] may often boil down to trials by social science 
experts” which the government is bound to win because it has deeper 
pockets and thus a greater capacity to commission research and hire 
experts.103 While this is admittedly a challenge, there are a number of 
recent precedent-setting Charter decisions in which claimants have 
introduced, and judges have duly considered, complex social science 
evidence in the criminal law context.104 This careful treatment of social 
science evidence stands in sharp contrast to the way that relatively 
uncontroversial social science evidence concerning mandatory minimum 
sentences was rejected outright on ideological grounds in recent parlia-
mentary hearings.105 
I am aware that my suggestion that the courts subject the purported 
goals, justifications and impacts of mandatory minimum sentences to a 
more searching form of Charter scrutiny is at odds with much of the 
conventional thinking about the respective institutional roles and capaci-
ties of courts and legislatures. The deferential, minimalist approach in the 
section 12 cases is based on the idea that it is generally not the courts’ 
role to question the policy choices of government.106 Even if it were 
possible to truly separate policy choices from other government deci-
sions that are appropriately the subject of judicial review, there are 
numerous examples, particularly in the criminal context, where the 
Supreme Court has seen fit to subject the government’s policy choices — 
and the real impact of the law at issue — to searching review. For 
example, in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),107 where a 
majority of the Court declared invalid a ban on prisoners serving two 
years or more from voting in federal elections, McLachlin C.J.C. held 
                                                                                                             
103 Roach, “Charter versus Government”, supra, note 39. 
104 Most recently, in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] B.C.J. No. 1196, 2012 
BCSC 886 (B.C.S.C.), Smith J considered many volumes of conflicting social science evidence in 
the course of concluding that the criminal offence of assisting suicide unjustifiably infringes ss. 7 
and 15 of the Charter. 
105 Scoffield, supra, note 87. 
106 See e.g., Latimer, supra, note 40, and Ferguson, supra, note 46. 
107 Sauvé, supra, note 101. 
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that the government’s objectives for disenfranchising citizen prisoners, 
namely enhancing civic responsibility and providing additional punish-
ment, were too vague and symbolic to justify limiting the right to vote. 
Her decision rejected the government’s attempts to justify the voting ban 
in a remarkably robust fashion which included, for example, calling the 
government’s arguments a “façade of rhetoric”.108 The majority also 
pointed to the fact that the government had not produced any evidence 
demonstrating that its objectives for the voting ban were being met, 
while there was evidence of the disproportionate impact of the voting 
ban on Indigenous prisoners who were, and are, overrepresented among 
the prison population. 
Of course, there are many other decisions in which a more deferen-
tial stance has been taken. However, my point is simply that policy 
choices in the context of criminal law are not immune from meaningful 
Charter scrutiny, particularly where they affect basic civil and political 
rights and where it appears that they are not evidence-based. We are 
arguably seeing a resurgence in substantive review of criminal law under 
the Charter, at least under section 7, with the recent decisions in Bedford 
v. Canada (Attorney General)109 and Canada v. PHS Community Ser-
vices.110 In the latter case, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
federal Health Minister’s decision to not grant an exemption from criminal 
drug laws for the Insite safe-injection clinic in Vancouver was arbitrary 
because it was inconsistent with the objective of promoting public health 
and public safety and was contradicted by the weight of social science 
evidence supporting the health outcomes achieved through the clinic. The 
Minister’s decision in PHS was based on a government policy choice that 
favoured a punitive approach to injection drug use over a harm reduction 
approach when the latter was strongly supported by the social science 
evidence. To be sure, the Court did not find the drug offences themselves 
invalid, but rather focused their decision on the “safety valve” of the 
exemption clause which, they held, prevented the drug offences from 
applying in an arbitrary manner.111 As such, the decision in PHS is 
arguably more consistent with an approach to Charter review that would 
                                                                                                             
108 Id., at para. 52. 
109 [2012] O.J. No. 1296, 109 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). The Ontario Court of Appeal held that 
the prostitution-related bawdy house offence in the Criminal Code was grossly disproportionate in 
its effects and therefore invalid under s. 7 of the Charter. The Court also read down the overly broad 
“living off the avails of prostitution” offence to only apply to “circumstances of exploitation”. 
110 Supra, note 94. 
111 Id., at para. 113. 
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permit constitutional exemptions, which have also been characterized as 
safety valves, than with a finding of invalidity. However, constitutional 
exemptions are not available under Ferguson to save mandatory mini-
mum sentences. Therefore, if courts are to abandon their deferential 
stance in this area, their decisions will likely lead to findings of invalidity 
along the lines of Smickle. 
A further implication of my call for greater scrutiny of the relation-
ship between the objectives and actual consequences of mandatory 
minimum sentences, particularly if it leads to findings of invalidity, is 
that it may well put the courts on a collision course with a federal 
government that is clearly committed to going down the punitive path it 
has carved out. In a manner unprecedented in the Charter era, the current 
government openly states its disagreement with Charter decisions made 
by the courts112 and expresses little enthusiasm for the Charter itself.113 
An “activist” decision that strikes down a mandatory minimum sentence 
may be just the issue that would persuade the federal government to 
invoke the section 33 legislative override.114 
                                                                                                             
112 In one high-profile example of this trend, in a speech delivered at the University of West-
ern Ontario in February 2011, Immigration Minister Jason Kenney criticized the approach taken by 
federal court judges in immigration cases: 
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undermine public confidence in the government’s ability to enforce our laws as passed by 
Parliament, and therefore in the entire system. 
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Charter on April 17, 2012, choosing instead to send out a short press release from the 
Ministers of Justice and Canadian Heritage. See Andy Blatchford, “Happy Birthday, Constitution: 
Tories’ gift will be a news release” Canadian Press (April 12, 2012), online: Global News 
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6442619706/story.html>. 
114 See also Kent Roach, “The Future of Mandatory Sentences after the Death of Constitu-
tional Exemptions” (2008) 54:1 Crim L.Q. 1, at 3 (suggesting that the s. 33 override might be used in 
a case involving a mandatory sentence). 
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Nevertheless, it is my view that we have reached a point where 
someone has to say that the Emperor has no clothes. There is a compel-
ling argument to be made that mandatory sentences deprive people of 
their liberty in a manner that is arbitrary. They have unintended conse-
quences that undercut their own purposes.115 To the extent that the courts 
have deferred to Parliament’s faulty logic and purposes that are contra-
dicted by a substantial and growing body of evidence, they have lent 
legitimacy to a broken system that has immense human and fiscal costs. 
A more robust form of judicial review of mandatory minimum sentences 
on Charter grounds is not a full answer to addressing the proliferation of 
harmful criminal justice policies that are not evidence-based. However, 
there is a role for judges to play in examining the evidence where 
policy makers do not. It is my hope that by the time we mark the Char-
ter’s next big anniversary, we will be able to celebrate its role in contrib-
uting to a retreat from mandatory minimum sentences as one of its 
accomplishments. 
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